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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates VHF Intercept and Direction Finding
(DP) collection systems developed by ESL International, Watkin
Johnson, and HRB Singer for induction into a divisional level
signal battalion of the Pakistan army. The introduction of
the proposed system is expected to enhance existing intercept
and Direction Finding (DF) capabilities. This thesis
evaluates the three systems on the basis of performance,
design, and supportability characteristics. In the process
each system element is further broken into subelements
composed of significant intercept and DF system
characteristics. The expected threat environment and the
capabilities of modern intercept and DF systems provided
practical and workable rationale and criteria for this
purpose.
The conclusion is that the system developed by ESL
International offers significant capabilities of meeting the
needs of expected divisional level threat environments. A
major recommendation is that the system capabilities be
verified by carrying out a dedicated operational testing
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Electronic devices have become an essential part of a
military force for command and control, logistic support and
control of weapons. On one hand, use of such electronic
devices extend excellent command and control opportunities,
and on the other, their increased use has inherent risks and
vulnerabilities. These dangers have established themselves
as important weapons of war. The threat of Electronic Warfare
(EW) is fact and in any future war we will have to face an
organized electronic warfare effort by the enemy. Electronic
warfare is becoming one of the most effective weapons in the
armory of any nation facing a sophisticated threat. Properly
used in support of a tactical plan, electronic warfare can
turn out to be a battle winning factor. Therefore, the need
for having a sizable capability in this area must be
considered.
Because of its clandestine nature and the high security
barriers erected around it, EW is one of the least-understood
aspects of military activity of our times and has for many
come to represent a "black art" to which only a chosen elite
are permitted access. To some extent this is necessary, since
electronic warfare must by its nature keep its secrets, as far
as possible, to be effective. On the other hand, electronic
warfare must absorb the latest advances in electronics
technology if they are perceived to be of potential value.
Despite these factors, electronic warfare is not
fundamentally a complex subject and is as old as the
technology of electronics itself. Historically, electronic
warfare in its most basic form, that of interception of other
people's communication has been with us almost since the
introduction of communication via radio. As soon as radio
communications came into general use, there was always some
unauthorized person prepared to eavesdrop on them. Apart from
realizing that he may be overheard, there was little that the
user could do to counter this.
In the modern electronic battle field, communication plays
a pivotal role to control forces, to know their deployment and
maneuvers, and to fire weapons. Thus, there are tactical
reasons for the presence and activity of each transmitter.
Each higher headquarters needs two-way communications with
each of its subordinate headquarters; each element of a fire
control network must talk to other elements; and each mobile
unit must communicate with its commander. Under this
saturated communication scenario modern intercept and
direction finding (DF) systems provide timely and accurate
information that allow a decision maker to determine the
strength and location of enemy forces and enemy tactical
intentions. They also support electronic countermeasures
(ECM) activities, which can prevent the enemy from effectively
controlling his forces or using his weapons. Thus a clear
understanding of the theoretical basis of selected electronic
warfare (EW) missions, the concept of combat communication,
and the characteristics of the latest intercept and DF systems
is essential.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the
technological capabilities of VHF Intercept and Direction
Finding (DF) systems which could support the combat signal
communication at divisional level in the Pakistan Army.
II. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) MISSION CATEGORIES
A. GENERAL
Broadly speaking, Electronic Warfare is a military action
involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine,
exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic
spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The commonly employed definition,
however, is more restrictive. The term "electronic warfare"
includes only those devices designed to interfere with, or
prevent such interference with, the operation of military
systems that employ electromagnetic communications links. A
communication link is any system that conveys information from
one point to another. This includes voice and data links,
electromagnetic remote sensors such as radar and infrared
detectors, and radio navigation systems. The most extensive
employment of electronic warfare includes radar systems. In
this thesis the discussion considers only communication
systems.
Electronic Warfare (EW) involves three major categories;
electronic reconnaissance (ER) , electronic countermeasure
(ECM) , and electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM)
.
"Electronic reconnaissance is that branch of electronic
warfare involved in gathering, by electronic means.
information concerning the intentions and operations of the
enemy and the capabilities and characteristics of his
"communications" equipment. Electronic countermeasures is
that branch of electronic warfare involved in degrading the
usefulness of the enemy's "communications" equipment.
Electronic counter countermeasures is that branch of
electronic warfare involved in preventing the electronic
countermeasures of the enemy from degrading the usefulness of
communications equipment employed by friendly forces. [Ref.
1]
This thesis will focus on the electronic reconnaissance
area. A brief review of the Electronic Warfare categories is
helpful
.
B. ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE (ER)
The gathering of information in support of electronic
warfare activities takes place at three levels: the strategic
level, the tactical level, and the combat level.
Strategic Electronic Reconnaissance (ER) , is called
electronic intelligence (ELINT) and involves a long term
process of large amounts of data and extensive analysis.
Usually ELINT data are acquired by long-range signal-
monitoring (intercept) receivers from positions removed from
the combat zone and are typically used in the design of
electronic warfare equipment and the performing of strategic
planning.
Tactical ER, generally called electronic support measures
(ESM) , involves the gathering of information for use in
current (daily) operations. The intercept equipment is
generally located (at least temporarily) in the combat zone
and the analysis of data is more or less limited to
determining the locations and types of equipment currently
deployed by the enemy. As the name implies, tactical ER data
is used to perform tactical planning and to employ electronic
warfare equipment to meet current threats. [Ref. 1; p. 1.3]
Combat ER, also called electronic support measures,
identifies immediate threats and targets. Because of the
urgency, data analysis and presentations are usually automated
and, therefore, minimal. [Ref. 1; p. 1.4]
The equipment used in electronic support measures also
gathers intelligence, known as radiation intelligence (RINT)
,
and telemetry intelligence (TELINT) . RINT nd TELINT are a
part of ELINT. Radiation intelligence (RINT) is defined as
"intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of non-
information bearing elements extracted from the
electromagnetic energy unintentionally emanated by foreign
devices, equipments and systems excluding those generated by
the detonations of atomic or nuclear weapons. Many devices
such as vehicle ignition systems and power generators give off
detectable electromagnetic emission which, if not suppressed,
can yield useful intelligence to the enemy. Telemetry
intelligence (TELINT) is defined as the "technical and
intelligence information derived from the interception,
processing and analysis of foreign telemetry. In this
context, the telemetry is usually associated with such things
as missile and aircraft tests. [Ref. 2; p. 120]
C. ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM)
Electronic countermeasures are of two types - jamming and
deception. Jamming prevents or disrupts the passage, receipt,
or gathering of information by electronic means. Electronic
deception feeds false information to the enemy, either through
their electronic collection devices or directly to their
electronic systems. All types of electronic equipment are
vulnerable to both jamming and deception.
Jamming deliberately radiates or reradiates
electromagnetic energy to prevent or degrade the reception of
information by a receiver. A jammer delivers more power to
the receiver preventing the receiver from receiving its
intended signal. In general, the effectiveness of jamming
depends on the relative power between transmitter and jammer;
relative distance between transmitter, jammer, and receiver;
terrain barriers; and whether or not the receiver is using a
directional antenna.
Communications jamming interferes with enemy communication
systems. Used against secure communication systems, it may
force the enemy to transmit in the clear so that the
communications can be exploited for combat information.
Jamming also can aid in direction finding (DF) by forcing the
enemy to transmit longer, allowing time for multiple lines of
bearing (LOB) from different directions.
Jamming against communications equipment is accomplished
using spot, sweep, or barrage jamming.
Spot jamming may utilize a single frequency or multiple
frequencies through:
a. Sequential spot jamming, in which various
frequencies are jammed one at a time, in sequence.
b. Simultaneous multi-spot jamming, in which several
frequencies are jammed at the same time.
In both spot and sequential spot jamming the full power
of the jammer suppresses one frequency at a time, which
increases the effectiveness and range of the jammer. The main
disadvantage of spot jamming is that receivers can resist spot
jamming by slightly changing (detuning) the frequency they are
receiving.
In sweep jamming, the jammer goes through a frequency
range then repeats the sweep continuously. All frequencies
in the range are jammed and friendly frequencies may be
affected.
Barrage jamming spreads the jammer's power over a much
larger portion of the frequency spectrum than spot jamming,
thereby reducing the radiated power directed at any single
target frequency. It is similar to sweep jamming because
there are no frequencies free of jamming within the targeted
portion of the spectrum.
The advantage of barrage jamming is that more frequencies
can be jammed at the same time. The disadvantages are that
friendly frequencies may be jammed. Also, spreading the
jammer's power over a greater portion of the spectrum reduces
the amount of power available to jam each frequency, reducing
the effectiveness and range of the jammer.
The jamming signal may include an unlimited variety of
amplitude, frequency, or pulse modulating signals. The
capability of the jamming equipment, the nature of the signal
to be jammed, and the desired result determine the type of
modulation.
Reradiation jamming uses special equipment to receive the
enemy's transmissions, alter them in some way, and reradiate
the signal back to the enemy. The principal targets of
reradiation jamming are radars and navigation aids.
Electronic deception misleads the enemy in the
interpretation or use of information received by his
electronic systems. Normally, it is a part of a larger
deception operation and is seldom conducted alone. Electronic
deception has the following three forms:
a. Manipulative electronic deception
b. Simulative electronic deception
c. Imitative electronic deception
Manipulative electronic deception alters the
electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. It seeks to
counter hostile EW and SIGINT activities by manipulating
friendly electromagnetic emissions. The objective of
manipulative electronic deception is to have the enemy
analysts accept the information as valid and thereby arrive
at an erroneous conclusion concerning friendly activities and
intentions.
Simulative electronic deception misleads the enemy as to
the actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of the
friendly forces. It seeks to counter hostile EW and SIGINT
efforts by simulating non-existing units or capabilities or
by simulating actual units or capabilities at false locations.
Imitative electronic deception injects false or misleading
information directly into enemy communication networks. The
communication imitator gains admission as a substation of a
particular radio net and maintains that role until the desired
false information is passed to the enemy.
D. ELECTRONIC COUNTER - COUNTERMEASURES (ECCM)
Electronic warfare also involves actions taken to retain
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Maintaining
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effective, friendly communications on the battlefield depends
upon the solid base of tried and proven ECCM techniques. The
sole purpose of ECCM techniques is to ensure the continued
friendly use of electromagnetic spectrum for communications.
A close relationship exists between ECCM and Communication
Security (COMSEC) . Both of these defensive arts are based on
the same principle. The major goal of COMSEC is to ensure
that the friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum for
communications is unexploitable by the enemy and to ensure
security of transmission; whereas, the major goal of
practicing sound ECCM techniques is to ensure the continued
effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
ECCM should be preventive in nature. It should be planned
and employed to force the enemy to commit more jamming,
information gathering, and deception resources to a target
than it is worth or than he has readily available to him.
ECCM techniques must also force the enemy to doubt the
effectiveness of his jamming and deception efforts.
Preventive ECCM techniques are methods employed to
safeguard our communications from disruption and destruction
attempted by the enemy. These techniques include all measures
taken to avoid enemy detection and to deny enemy intelligence
analysts useful information. There are two categories of
preventive ECCM techniques:
a. ECCM designed circuits (equipment feature)
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b. Radio operating procedures/transmission control
Remedial ECCM techniques reduce the effectiveness of enemy
efforts to jam our radio nets. They apply only to enemy
jamming efforts or any unidentified or unintentional
interference which disrupts our ability to communicate. Here,
prevention is the only solution. We must attempt to prevent
enemy jamming and interference; but if we don't succeed, then
we must take the following actions to overcome it:
a. Recognize jamming / interference:
1) Determine whether the interference is internal
or external to the radio.
2) Determine whether the interference is jamming
or unintentional interference.
b. Overcome jamming / interference by:
1) Continuing to operate
2) Improving signal-to-jamming ratio
(a) Adjust the receiver
(b) Increase transmitter power output
(c) Adjust or change the antenna
(d) Establish a retransmission station
(e) Relocate the antenna
3) Using an alternate route for communication
4) Change frequency
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III. CONCEPT OF COMBAT COMMUNICATION IN A DIVISION
A. ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT
In the past, soldiers recognized two dimensions of the
battlefield - width and depth. The advent of aircraft forced
the recognition of the airspace as a third dimension.
Today another dimension of the battlefield must be
considered. Men of perception realize that the
"electromagnetic environment" has an ever increasing role in
modern tactics and combat. It's the dimension in which
radios, radars, and lasers operate. It pervades the other
three dimensions of the battlefield. This dimension is
limited only by the frequency spectrum and is measured in
terms of electronic emitters. The location of each of these
emitters is a critical intelligence activity.
The numbers of electronic devices operating in future
wars will be staggering. For example, one division has over
1000 electromagnetic emitters, and to this must be added the
thousands of emitters in adjacent divisions. Also we must
consider the communications used by the civilians in the area
of operations, plus those of the enemy forces. One can
clearly imagine that we are going to have to fight for our
share of the frequency spectrum. And since we are already at
a disadvantage on a man-against-man basis, we have got to be
13
better at gaining and keeping control of the frequency
spectrum than the threat force.
Threat forces also know that the key to success in combat
is an effective communication system. To defeat us, they
must attack and destroy our system. They will use electronic
warfare (EW) to destroy as many command, control,
intelligence and weapon communication systems as possible.
Their major electronic offensive will happen during the first
minute of the first battle.
Our ability to counter their electronic warfare (EW)
effort will mean the difference between winning and losing.
Electronic communications is not something separate from the
combat scene; it is a part of the total weapons system and,
as such, requires flexible tactics for employment. The
communicators are responsible for the proper use of this
essential part of combat power, and we must know how to
handle it.
B. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SIGNAL CORPS
Responsibility for providing communications is shared
between the signal corps and the other arms/services. Armor,
artillery, engineers, and infantry units in corps and
divisions are responsible for regimental/battalion
communications from unit headquarters downwards.
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The signal corps provides and coordinates all
communications in the army down to the point where they are
taken over by regimental/battalion units. In addition
signals corps is responsible for communication intelligence.
On the enemy side of the border, a similar concept of combat
communication exists. To insure effective communication
intelligence, it is necessary to have a broad look at the
means of communications available in the field and their use
in various operations of war.
C. COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES
Information takes many forms and the means to communicate
it ranges from the simple to the complex. The system
required depends on the type of information to be
transmitted, the form in which it will be received and the
security and speed required.
D. RADIO
Radio systems are identified by their electronic
characteristics. The following is a general list of radio
equipment characteristics. Some combinations of these will
identify any given division radio and help to fit it into the
system being designed:
a. Frequency band:
1) High frequency (HF) : 2-30 MHZ
2) Very high frequency (VHF) : 3 0-3 00 MHZ
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b. Type of modulation:
1) Frequency modulation (FM)
2) Amplitude modulation (AM)
c. Channel capacity: Single channel
d. Modes of operation:
1) Voice
2) Secure voice
3) Frequency shift keying (FSK)
4) Radio teletypewriter (RTT)
5) Single sideband (SSB)
Radio is the most widely used means of communications in
a division. It is also the most susceptible to enemy
electronic warfare (EW) activities. The communicator must
have a full understanding of the capabilities, limitations,
and technical characteristics of the radios employed on the
battlefield during various operations of war. Improper
installation, operation and maintenance may bring defeat just
as quickly as other tactical blunders.
Cryptographic security devices are another important
aspect of the tactical radio system. These devices connect
to single channel radio sets and encrypt either voice or
teletypewriter traffic, depending upon the security device
used.
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Radio has a big disadvantage, too. Radio direction
finding (RDF) combined with other intercept and DF analysis
provides an accurate picture of our situation and positions
to enemy observers.
E. WIRE AND CABLE SYSTEM
In the division, field wire and cable systems provide:
a. Telephone service within command posts and major
headquarters
.
b. Telephone trunk circuits between unit switchboards
at brigade, division artillery, and below
c. Telephone circuits from multichannel terminal
equipment to subscribers and switchboards
d. The primary means of communication when radio
silence is necessary
There are some obvious advantages in using wire and cable
systems in a tactical situation. They eliminate the enemy's
ability to locate positions with radio direction finding
equipment. They also limit his ability to jam and otherwise
disrupt communications.
There are some disadvantages too. The distance between
subscribers; the time required for installation; maintenance
and recovery; and the user's need for mobility restrict wire
and cable use. Also, a wire and cable system, if it is not
properly installed, is extremely susceptible to enemy
17
artillery and damage by our own tanks, armored personnel
carriers and other tracked vehicles.
F. RADIO RELAY
Multichannel VHF radio relay systems provide a standby to
wire and cable systems in a division. Though it offers
directional communication, it is still susceptible to enemy
electronic warfare (EW) activities. Sound technical and
tactical considerations must govern its employment.
Cryptographic security devices are another important part of
the radio relay system. Antenna location must meet both
technical and tactical requirements. Efficient operation of
the system requires coordination between radio relay terminal,
multiplex and main system control. The following is a list
of radio relay equipment characteristics:
a. Frequency band:
1) Very high frequency (VHF) : 30-300 Mhz
2) Ultra high frequency (UHF) : 300-600 Mhz
b. Type of modulation: Frequency modulation (FM)
c. Channel capacity: 4, 12 and 24 channels
d. Modes of operation:
1) Voice
2) Secure voice
3) Frequency shift keying (FSK)
4) Radio teletypewriter (RTT)
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e. Type of multiplex equipment:
1) Frequency division multiplexing (FDM)
2) Time division multiplexing (TDM)
G. MESSENGER SERVICE
The classification of messenger service depends on the
type of messenger. A well planned and coordinated system will
include foot, motorcycle, jeep, and air messengers, as needed.
Messengers provide a secure means of delivery for packages/
messages, but the availability of personnel and transportation
and the tactical situation itself limit the service. Despatch
rider service is either scheduled or special. Scheduled
service has a pre-arranged schedule. Special service, on the
other hand, occurs when special handling or more rapid service
is required.
H. COMMUNICATION FOR DEFENSE
In order to fight a defensive battle successfully, a
commander must receive information quickly and be able to act
on that information by passing orders. The attack may come
at any time and from any direction. If it is to be broken up,
the commander must be able to concentrate his infantry,
artillery, and air at the right place without delay. It is
the responsibility of the signal corps to produce a sound
communication system which will enable centralized control to
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be exercised quickly and which is not likely to fail at the
critical time. The communication means to be employed and
available with signal corps are as follows:
Ground lines, with their greater traffic capacity,
security and simplicity will form the backbone of the
communication system in defense. Signal corps communication
at all levels coordinates all line networks in the operational
area and lays down the priorities for laying and burying of
lines. Normally artillery and signals communications
complement each other and act as alternative channels.
Continued and progressive improvements make the line system
safe and provide alternative routes. Reserve forces held for
counter attack mainly rely on line communication since they
observe electronic silence until they are committed to battle.
Defensive operations seldom use multichannel VHF/UHF radio
relays. Radio relays may be used in the initial stages when
the line network is being laid out. However, there is a
possibility of its use of providing communications to a
covering force if it is large and is comprised of all arms
elements.
Radio (HF/VHF) will always be a secondary means of
communication, but it is a good standby to line and radio
relay. All formations and units exercise radio silence in the
defense but the counterattack force keeps it ready and
immediately uses it upon engaging. Radio may be the chief
20
means of communication for the covering troops since they are
highly mobile and operate at distances far from the main
defenses. Similarly, air support uses radio to assist in
breaking up enemy attacks. Radio may also be used for pure
deceptive roles to give the enemy a false impression regarding
dispositions, strength, etc.
I. COMMUNICATION FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The frequent moves of headquarters, changes in grouping,
and the increase in distances between them present
considerable communication problems in the advance. It will
help in maintaining good communication if headquarters are
kept well forward and moved in as large bounds as possible.
During this phase the divisional signal resources are
preserved as much as possible to ensure their availability on
contact with the enemy.
Radio is the primary means of communication when
headquarters are on the move and facilities are not tied down
to static positions. During the move, interference, both
atmospheric and electrical especially on HF sets, will reduce
the effectiveness of this means of communication considerably.
Enemy jamming capabilities may at times render a net or a
complete band useless. During the advance, it may become
necessary to impose radio silence for security and deception
purposes.
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Radio relay communication characteristics make it
extremely adaptable to the conditions before contact with the
enemy. The relay links are normally used in leap-frog
arrangement. This system eliminates the time lag imposed by
laying line communication and provides efficient
communication. The system does not offer security, especially
in the forward areas and is susceptible to jamming by the
enemy. Using radio relay, in preference to lines, preserves
the line resources for use at a later stage.
Land lines are still valuable in the advance. Their
usefulness will depend largely on the rate of advance and the
accuracy with which further locations of headquarters can be
forecast. The advisability of laying cable during even the
very slowest advance is carefully weighed against the time and
space factor, resources available, likely future requirements,
etc.
J. COMMUNICATION FOR ATTACK AND PURSUIT PHASE
A major attack starts from a position with fully developed
line communications (as in the defense) . Communications
become progressively harder to maintain as the attack
develops. Radio and, to a certain extent, radio relay take
over most of the channels of communication from lines.
Line communication ensures maximum signal security when
the attacking units are in their assembly area, just before
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the attack. Once the assault and destructive phase have
started, all available means of communication are used.
Radio silence may be partial or total during the
preparatory phase for the purpose of security or deception.
Here the air support communications are as important as normal
command radio communication. During the assault phase, radio
becomes the primary means of communication. Similarly, during
the pursuit phase, radio provides intercommunication to and
within the pursuit force.
Radio relay links are more secure in rear areas behind
divisions than in forward areas, where they are as unsafe as
radio from a security point of view. But the characteristic
of radio relay makes it the backbone of rearward communication
of the pursuit force, whenever its headquarters becomes
stationary. Relay stations become essential when the distance
to the pursuit force increases.
K. COMMUNICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL
In the withdrawal, distances between headquarters tend to
be stretched and headquarters are often split to allow for
control on one position and reconnaissance and coordination
on another. Signal resources are likely to be taxed to the
limit in the withdrawal, since they do not cater to the
splitting of headquarters for prolonged periods. In addition,
step-up, traffic control, and administrative purposes require
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radio communication. In withdrawal existing land lines and
radio relay communication links usually will be available to
fall back upon. It may be necessary to lay short spurs or an
additional radio relay station to bridge gaps in line or radio
relay systems. But when the withdrawal is to a position away
from the existing arteries or when the enemy attempts to
envelop the force and succeeds in cutting the lines of
communication, the task of providing the communication becomes
more difficult. It is quite likely that line and radio relay
communication will be impossible, and radio will become the
principal means of communication. However, radio relay can
be used to great advantage. In withdrawal the secrecy of
intention, timing, route, grouping and the new defensive
positions are important and the communication system, whatever
it may be, must deny all this to the enemy.
When withdrawal is along the existing cable arteries;
satisfactory line communication to the rear and forward troops
is quite simple by laying short spurs from the main artery.
Hasty withdrawal may force routes other than existing main
arteries; then radio will be the principal means of
communication. Withdrawal may create panic, confusion, and
poor discipline. Therefore control in general and rearward
traffic control in particular requires special separate
traffic control communication.
24
Radio silence may be partial or complete since secrecy in
withdrawal is essential. This is of course weighed against
the loss of control. At times imposing of radio silence gives
away what it would not otherwise, and this is more likely to
be the case in withdrawal. Withdrawal may require several
routes. Since radio is independent of the restrictions
imposed by the routes of existing lines it is deployed to the
fullest extent within the limits imposed by radio silence.
Radio, due to its flexibility and mobility, is most useful and
will probably be the principal means of communication during
withdrawal, particularly for covering troops or rear-guard due
to their mobile nature.
Radio relay multichannel networks should be coordinated
in such a way that the existing terminals and relays in the
rear should be used by the headquarters withdrawing, along the
same axis. If there are no restrictions on the use of radio,
radio relay stations should be used to bridge the gaps in line
communication. This allows the line parties to reel up,
provided the time and the tactical situation permits. Setting




IV. MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN COMMUNICATION
A. GENERAL
Communication warfare is an element of warfare that pits
potential communicators against hostile personnel who seek to
intercept or disrupt their communication. In the armies of
developed countries, covert communication techniques have cut
down the possibility of intercepting and interpreting
communications
.
Various general measures will reduce communication
susceptibility to interception and jamming severely. Using
frequencies exceeding 30 MHZ will minimize the long range
interception and jamming possibilities, since ionospheric
reflections are small. Similarly, millimeter waves and
highly directional laser beams are difficult to intercept.
Their receivers are difficult to jam due to the narrow
radiation patterns of the receiving antennas. Special
applications such as satellite communication can eliminate
these problems.
Cable communication by metallic wires, coaxial cable, wave
guides and by optical fibers provide advantages similar to
those of directional beams, but without the acquisition
problem. The main problems with cables are their
impracticality in mobile, rapidly changing tactical
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environments and their susceptibility to damage. Since
optical fibers do not emit a significant amount of
electromagnetic energy, they are very effective in preventing
the interception of communications by the enemy. Tapping is
more difficult than it is for a metallic cable. Other
advantages of optical fiber communication are light weight,
lack of crosstalk and invulnerability to jamming. A major
disadvantage is the difficulty in rapid replacement of damaged
fiber.
Technological advances are providing the "force
multiplier" required to command, control, and win battles.
At present and in the near future, the technological strides
discussed below are taking/will take place. The key to
providing effective communication systems is to imbed that
technology in new developments and field them as quickly as
possible.
B. SPREAD SPECTRUM COMMUNICATION
Spread spectrum communication is one of the most
significant innovations. It produces a signal with a
bandwidth much wider than the message bandwidth. Because a
spread spectrum system distributes the transmitted energy over
a wide bandwidth, the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver
is low. Nevertheless, the receiver is capable of operating
successfully because the transmitted signal has distinct
27
characteristics relative to the noise. [Ref. 3]
A pseudorandom noise code controls the waveform. It is
a binary sequence that is apparently random, but can be
reproduced deterministically by the intended user. The
pseudonoise code gives spread spectrum systems identification
and selective calling capabilities. [Ref. 3 ]
Spread spectrum systems are useful for military
communications because they make it difficult to detect the
transmitted waveform, i.e, low probability of intercept (POI)
.
The system is difficult to jam and offers high data rate from
transmission and reception. The most widely used spread
spectrum methods are
a. direct sequence (DS) modulation, in which a fast
pseudorandom sequence causes phase transitions in
the carrier containing data;
b. frequency hopping (FH) , in which the carrier shifts
frequency in a pseudorandom way; and
c. time hopping (TH) , where burst signals are
initiated at pseudorandom times. Hybrid
combinations of these techniques are frequently
used, such as FH/DH/TH. [Ref. 4]
A burst communication system transmits data in a high-
speed bit stream, which is closely associated with spread
spectrum signals. Here the maximum transmission duration of
a bit stream is rarely longer than 30 to 45 seconds. Thus,
burst communication systems are less susceptible to detection
than other form of tactical communications. Simply by virtue
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of their minimal transmitting period, spread spectrum
techniques are utilized throughout the frequency range in
order to optimize the information carrying capacity under
military stressed situations such as jamming and interception.
[Ref. 4]
C. METEOR BURST COMMUNICATION (MBC)
Meteor burst communication is based on RF signals bouncing
off ionized trails in the atmosphere. The ionized trails of
electron are caused by meteorites bombarding the earth's
atmosphere. The size of each trail and its duration as a
reflecting or reradiatory path of RF signals depends largely
on the size of the meteor. The height of these trails range
from 85 km to approximately 125 km. Meteor burst systems
usually operate at VHF between 30 MHZ and 50 MHZ. The heights
and the curvature of the earth limit communication to ranges
around 2000 km, but there is no dead space between zero and
maximum range, as is the case with HF. [Ref. 4]
In a typical meteor burst system, one station continuously
broadcasts a "probe" signal. Receipt of this probe signal by
a second station indicates the existence of a usable meteor
trail and the second station responds over the reciprocal
path. The life time of a useful path ranges from four
milliseconds to several seconds. A typical trail lasts for
a few hundred milliseconds, with wait time between trails
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ranging from seconds to minutes, depending on daily and annual
cycles. Each message consists of bursts of high-speed data
of tens to hundreds of characters separated by periods of
silence. [Ref. 4]
Generally, the "footprint" of the signal is elliptical in
shape with major axis in the direction of transmission
(typically 30 miles major axis and 15 miles minor axis) . This
permits multiple use of radio frequencies and provides
protection against unwanted intercept and jamming.
Additionally, MBC systems don't utilize the ionosphere so they
recover from atmospheric nuclear events more quickly than HF
systems. [Ref. 4]
In general, two types of MBC systems exist: in telemetry,
in which large number of remote stations report weather data
to a single master; and in point to point message
communications, between two military headquarters or through
large systems comprising many nodes. Each key node has master
station equipment and may have a larger number of such nodes
with remote stations. In addition to the advances made in
improving throughput and wait time and in enhancing
flexibility, significant improvements have been made in
networking software, which enables MBC message communication
systems to handle traffic efficiently. Keeping in view the
scope of this research work further quantitative discussion
on this aspect of MBC is not possible. [Ref. 4]
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D. FIBER OPTICS
Using optical fiber systems in tactical operations
supports force dispersion and enables high-value targets to
remain hidden. Many defense installations are turning to
fiber optic transmission systems as the preferred alternative
to copper wire, coaxial and microwave systems in new and
existing local area networks. There are a number of reasons
for this growing interest in fiber optics.
a. Fiber optic cable is dielectric, so it does not
bleed off electrical signals and thus provides
greater security than traditional systems.
b. Fiber optic cable is immune to electromagnetic
pulse, which precludes the potential for electrical
serge that can disturb computer operations.
c. Fiber optic systems are well suited to the
distributed data environment found at defense
installations, since the bandwidth of fiber optic
cable is unaffected by the distances of two miles
or more.
d. Optical fiber can be extended 10 - 20 km or longer
without the need for repeaters.
e. Optical fiber cable occupies far less space than
normal copper wire, making it possible to achieve
highly efficient transmission while conserving
space.
f. Fiber optic transmission systems offer an
alternative to circuit crowding because they
eliminate the line-of-sight problems associated
with microwave transmission.
g. Fiber optic is smaller in size, lightweight,
flexible and high tensile strength cable.
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h. Fiber optic cable is not affected by
electromagnetic interference (EMI) and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
.
i. In view of greater bandwidth capability in a given
duct space, it proves less expensive than metallic
cables. [Ref. 4]
Optical fibers are made from an abundant and inexpensive
material, silica Si02. There are two types of optical
waveguide fibers, i.e., multimode and single mode having
diameters 20-150 microns and 1.5-8 microns respectively. Good
quality multimode fibers can transmit 1000 Mb/s over 1 km.
At the lower rate of 1000 Mb/s, the repeater spacing can be
greater, about 10 - 20 km. [Ref. 5]
Single-mode optical fiber systems propagate light rays
along a single direct path along the fiber core in contrast
to multi-mode systems where the light rays can bounce back and
forth on many zig-zag paths as they move along the fiber.
Without elaborate multiplexing schemes, single-mode optical
fiber systems can transmit, without regeneration by a
repeater, up to 200 Mb/s over 80 - 100 km. [Ref. 4]
Fiber optic communication links include a transmitter, a
light source, a fiber optic cable, a photodetector and
receiver. The light source is a light emitting diode or laser
diode that accepts an electrical input signal. The fiber
transmits the optical output energy to the signal with some
small attenuation and distortion. At the far end, the
32
receiver photodetector converts the optical energy back to
electrical form.
Fiber optic systems can transmit data, voice and video.
The system is ideal for synchronous or asynchronous data
transmission, particularly at longer distances. Data
transmission over fiber usually requires less bandwidth than
do voice and video transmission, and it is accomplished via
a binary digital signal with a low error rate typically 10"'.
[Ref. 5] The significant trend today is toward fiber optic
systems that accommodate transmission of both data and voice.
This entails the multiplexing of different types of media over
the same transmission system.
The choice of network topology depends on specific
circumstances, but selection will involve three basic types -
star, ring and bus. These are not mutually exclusive,
however, because a combination of all three can be used in
larger LANs. The factors which must be considered while
choosing fiber optic cable include current and future
bandwidth requirements, acceptable attenuation rates, length
of cable and cost of installation, mechanical requirements,
signal source, connectors and terminations, cable dimensions
and physical environments. [Ref. 5]
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E. MILLIMETER WAVELENGTH
The millimeter wave (MMW) region of the electromagnetic
spectrum has received increased interest in recent years due
to significant advances in the development of transmitters,
receivers, devices and components. The MMW region finds use
in systems applications such as radar, radiometry, radio
astronomy, missile guidance, communications and spectroscopy.
The MMW region of the electromagnetic spectrum covers the
frequency range from 3 GHZ to 3 00 GHZ (or wave length between
1 cm and 1 mm; 30-3 00 GHZ is the EHF band) . Other current
terminology associated with the MMW region includes "near-
millimeter waves" for frequencies from approximately 100 GHz
(sometimes from 90 GHZ) to 1000 GHZ and sub-millimeter from
about 150 to 3000 GHZ.
One characteristic of the MMW frequency range is that for
a given physical antenna size (aperture) the antenna beamwidth
is smaller and the gain is higher than at microwave
frequencies. Therefore, to obtain a specified antenna gain
or narrow beamwidth, a much smaller antenna may be used. MMWs
are a very promising media for line of sight communications
in the lower atmosphere under battlefield environmental
conditions. These waves exhibits high data rates and low
propagation losses in the 35 GHZ and 94 GHZ atmospheric
windows. [Ref. 4]
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MMW systems are superior to optical and infrared systems
for penetration of smoke, fog, haze, dust, clouds and other
adverse environments. The improved technology includes better
sources (such as Gunn oscillators, gyrotrons, extended
interaction oscillators [EIOs] , extended interaction klystron
amplifiers [EIKAs], magnetrons and travelling wave tubes)
which have higher power outputs or operate at higher
frequencies and, in some cases, have longer life times than
earlier designs. [Ref. 4]
F. LOCAL AREA NETWORKS (LAN)
Local area networks for army headquarters have the
following characteristics: high data rates (.1 - 100 Mbps)
,
short distances (.1 - 50 km) and low error rate (10" -10" ).
Implementing a local network has a number of significant
benefits. First, and most important, modifications and
enhancements have little impact on the other devices on the
network. Therefore, a system evolves gradually rather than
through a few major upgrades. Other benefits include higher
system availability (critical resources can be duplicated and
functions shifted from failed processors to alternate
processors with no interconnect problems) , sharing of
expensive resources, reduction of amount of cabling and
interconnections required, easier integration of equipment and
functions, and greater flexibility of equipment location. Of
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course, local networking does not guarantee interoperability.
The network only provides connection compatibility, electrical
connectivity and perhaps some lower level protocols.
Interoperability requires, in addition, application
compatibility, which is not automatically provided by the
network. [Ref. 4]
Local area networks are frequently characterized in terms
of their topology. Three topologies are common, star, ring,
and bus or tree. Modern local networking systems are
characterized by bandwidth of consecutive frequencies and high
data rates of several million bits per second. These systems
use coaxial cable, twisted pair wire, or fiber optic
transmission media. [Ref. 5]
G. SATELLITE COMMUNICATION
Over the past several years, the service requirements for
satellite communication (SATCOM) have increased steadily to
a point where satellites operate at full load capacity. With
the advent of SATCOM, links were established easily. They
were reliable, stable (nonfading) , terrain independent and not
affected by the atmosphere. The satellite link is a quasi-
channel affected by the atmospheric absorption due to rain and
cloud coverage. The effect of rain can be compensated by a
nominal downlink margin. [Ref. 4]
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In discussing satellite communication, it is difficult to
differentiate tactical and strategic communications. A
terminal at corps headquarters in the field can just as
easily communicate with a division in a tactical environment
as it can communicate with the commander-in-chief thousands
of miles away regarding a strategic matter. Of course the
satellite is indifferent to tactical or strategic traffic.
At present time, two frequency bands have been allocated and
are being used, i.e., [Ref. 4]
a. UHF Band
Ground to satellite 335.4 - 399.9 MHZ
Satellite to ground 225.0 - 328.6 MHZ
b. SHF Band
Ground to satellite 7.250 - 7.700 GHZ
Satellite to ground 7.900 - 8.400 GHZ
In the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS II)
a constellation of four satellites provides for global
communication. DSCS II is a spin stabilized satellite having
both earth coverage and narrow beam antennas. The satellite
has four transponders. The transponders are transparent; that
is, they receive RF carriers and retransmit the signal on a
downlink frequency. One of the transponders, in conjunction
with the narrow beam antenna, is used for tactical
communications. The coverage area of the narrow beam antenna
37
has a 2.5 degree bandwidth covering an area of 1,000 miles in
diameter at the subsatellite point. [Ref. 4]
Eventually, DSCS III satellites will replace the DSCS II
variety. DSCS III is a three axis stabilized satellite with
six transponders operating in the 7/8 GHZ band. The satellite
uses earth coverage antennas and a 61 beam waveguide lens
antennas for receiving the uplink, earth coverage and two 19
beam waveguide lens antennas for the downlink. In addition
it also has a dish antenna to service the ground mobile forces
(GMF) tactical terminals. [Ref. 4]
The GMF Satellite Communication System (GMFSCS) will
satisfy critical command and control multichannel transmission
requirements between command echelons from theater army down
to maneuver brigade level. The terminals can provide command
and control links between air defense, artillery brigade and
other groups.
GMF requirements for satellite communication falls into
two broad categories of data rates; high data rate, full
duplex multichannel trunking and low data rate for netting
operations. While multichannel trunking uses the SHF band,
single channel netting utilizes the UHF band.
Satellites are vulnerable to electronic and physical
attack. Electronic countermeasures can protect SATCOM from
intentional interference. By spreading the information over
a large bandwidth, either by direct pseudonoise sequence.
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frequency hopping or both. Physical attack of a synchronous
satellite would require placing an antisatellite (ASAT)
weapon in the vicinity of the satellite (22,300 miles) or from
directed energy beam weapons which would require large
expenditures by the attacker.
Future satellite communication systems will provide the
following:
a. Survivability - satellites will be hardened against
physical, nuclear effects and electronic jamming.
b. Increased Interoperability - through standardized
waveforms, signal processing and encryption devices.
c. Processing Satellite - satellite will include baseband
processing; that is, frequency dehopping, demodulation,
rerouting and remodulation.
d. Cross-links between geostationary satellites and for
access to low orbiting or inclined satellites. The
cross-link can be either at RF (60 GHZ or greater) or
by laser communication.
e. Wideband satellites that can transmit hundreds of mega
bits of protected traffic. This could involve laser
satellite (LASERSAT) or satellites operating in the EHF
band. [Ref. 4]
39
V. INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION FINDING SYSTEMS
A . GENERAL
Over the last ten years the evolutionary progress made in
communication technology transmission methods, modulation
waveforms, and communication schemes discussed in Chapter IV
has changed the tactical military electromagnetic environment
drastically. This situation presents formidable challenges
to surveillance receivers and intercept systems. These modern
technologies require specialized surveillance systems to
counter them. Approaches include microscan. Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) receiving systems, and other types of
compressive receivers. [Ref. 6] Changes in the approach to
surveillance systems has also brought improvements in the
conventional superheterodyne receivers which monitor the
communication spectrum. A digitally tuned superheterodyne
receiver has fast tuning, wide frequency coverage, the ability
to monitor multiple waveforms, programmable search, selectable
IF bandwidths, various demodulators and amplitude/phase
tracking characteristics which are consistent with DF
applications. [Ref. 7]
Like interception and monitoring in communication
intelligence, direction finding (DF) is a primary intelligence
source for locating enemy communication centers. Generally,
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the communication centers are located in close proximity to
command posts and command and control nodes, which make them
attractive targets for both physical and electronic attack.
Similarly, a concentration of emitters within an area may
indicate the presence or absence of activities undetectable
by other means of intelligence. A typical Direction Finding
(DF) system consists of a receiver, DF processor and antenna.
A DF system attempts to determine the location of an emitter




A communication intercept receiver system monitors the
frequency spectrum over a pre-defined range and determines the
frequency, signal strength, signal type, and the time of any
signal present. To do this, the system first carries out a
spectral search; also termed a spectral surveillance. This
offers an indication of signal activity, usually in the form
of a panoramic display. Following the search, and at the
direction of the operator, the system analyzes signals
acquired. [Ref. 6]
A spectral search consists of two operations: interception
and detection. The interception of signals involves the
tuning of the receiver detection band to a certain frequency
at a time coincident with signal activity at that frequency.
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The range of frequencies over which the receiver
simultaneously detects all signals present is the detection
band. Signal interception does not mean signal detection.
In fact, detection depends on the amount of time the signal
remains within the detection band. If the detection bandwidth
covers the frequency range of interest; the probability of
interception depends on two parameters: the data acquisition
time and the processing time. The data acquisition time is
the time required to evaluate signal activity. The processing
time is the time required to perform the necessary post
processing. In superheterodyne surveillance receivers, the
post processor simply consists of an energy detector followed
by a threshold comparator. [Ref. 8]
Signal analysis implies many things. It can be a simple
demodulation of a signal, or it can be a detailed spectral
analysis of the signal. Also, analysis can involve more
exotic processing such as call sign recognition, language
recognition and translation. The difference between the
analysis mode and surveillance mode is that the analysis mode
processes only a received signal over its bandwidth. In
surveillance mode, an entire frequency range of interest goes
through processing, although not necessarily on all
frequencies at once. [Ref. 8]
Modern ESM receivers have extensive emitter libraries,
which contain the history of previously identified emitters,
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obtained through ELINT and tactical intelligence information
of hostile emitters. Received signal parameters like
frequency, type of signal, frequency band occupancy, signal
strength, duration of transmission and amount of transmission
activity. A match between these parameters and the emitter
library triggers the analysis subsystem to investigate this
signal. [Ref. 9]
Microprocessors, being the heart of the ESM receiver
system, perform various functions like
a. Control the receiver functions
b. Perform automatic scanning, signal identification and
logging
c. Accept operator commands from the keyboard
d. Output data to the graphic terminal
e. Save and recall pages of information. [Ref. 8]
Advances and improvements in the field of artificial
intelligence (AI) have made the ESM system capable of
recognizing the patterns. With further developments this will
become a common feature of all intercept and surveillance
systems. [Ref. 9]
Software controls the receiver by selecting the center
frequency, frequency span, threshold level, etc. Under
operator command, the receiver operates in one of two modes:
manual mode and automatic mode. In the manual mode the
operator has direct control of the receiver and selects the
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frequency, IF bandwidth, signal identification and emitter
logging, by keyboard commands. In the automatic mode, the
operator specifies the instructions and the receiver
automatically steps through the selected band. Typically, the
receiver provides a spectrum analyzer type of trace on the
graphic terminal and performs signal sorting, identification,
and logging. In addition, the operator can stop between




Figure 1 illustrates a commonly used direction finding
technique: horizontal or azimuth triangulation for
determination of an unknown location. Here, two or more DF
sites connected by a communication link measure azimuth angles
to an emitter. The separation distance of the sites is















Figure 1 - Emitter location by triangulation
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A ground based DF system may be fixed or movable depending
upon the operational needs and terrain. A digital computer
controls the system, enabling the designer to employ a DF
antenna of his choice. The existing real-time signal
processing techniques provide both phase and amplitude
responses of the received signal, and with proper antennas can
respond to signals of any polarization. In the VHF band,




The processor uses output signal voltages of the receiver
system to locate the emitter location. Usually such systems
employ modular software, that adapt to a variety of antenna
systems and optional capabilities like networking, signal
acquisition and monitoring. The system maintains a bearing
history for the acquired emitter locations and updates this
in case of any change. This helps in correct identification
of a previously seen emitter and also serves as a warning in
case a new emitter comes up in the threat environment.
Typical DF azimuth accuracy achieved by a modern DF system
ranges between ±1° to ±3°. [Ref. 9] The following factors are
of major importance when planning a DF system acquisition
a. Ground and terrain in which the emitter operates
b. Operating frequencies of the emitter
c. Measurement accuracy desired (this determines the
number of DF stations required)
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d. Response time (time required to process the signal,
match them against the emitter library and display
the finished results)
e. Physical limitations of the system. [Ref. 7]
D. CLASSIFICATION OF DF SYSTEM
The technique for obtaining information about the arriving
signal at the antenna and the subsequent processing of that
information classifies the DF system into two broad
categories: scalar systems and vector or phasor systems. If
only the direction of the signal of interest is taken into
consideration then the system is classified as a scalar
system. But, if the system obtains direction and range
information about these signals then it is classified as
vector or phasor system. In simple terms, the first category
of the system deals with either amplitude or phase information




'\'- Figure 2 shows the rotary loop arrangement employed in
most scalar systems. [Ref . 7] Since most of the scalar systems
measure the signal strength, they have to rely upon some form
of symmetry. Figure 2 clearly indicates this fact where the
system depends on the figure of 8 symmetry of its vertically
polarized amplitude response. The Adcock and Watson watt




















PLAN VIEW OF LOOP
Figure 2 - Rotary Loop System
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Systems which deal with the phase information of the
signal of interest usually employ multiport antenna systems.
Examples are Interferometer and Doppler systems. In vector
systems the relative amplitudes and phases measured on
different antenna elements uniquely define the bearing, both
in azimuth and elevation angles of a single incident plane
wave of a specified frequency origination from a source. [Ref
.
7]
The two systems (Watkin Johnson and HRB Singer) under
evaluation employ interferometer techniques for emitter
location. It is worthwhile to describe the technique briefly.
a. Interferometer Technique
One form of this technique uses a small/wide
aperture interferometer consisting of three electrically short
vertical dipoles (having separation greater than X./2)
arranged in an equilateral triangle. Centrally located among
the feed points of the elements is an enclosure containing a
low noise preamplifier for each element. The relative phases
measured on these three elements uniquely defines the bearing,
azimuth and elevation angles.
The method used in the DF processor to determine
a signal's bearing angle involves correlating the complex
voltages measured at the antenna elements against a set of
stored voltage patterns, each of which corresponds to an
incident wave of the same frequency illuminating the antenna
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from a different direction. An indicated DF bearing is the
azimuth angle that maximizes the magnitude of the complex
correlation coefficient. The approach used in such systems
is based on a parabolic approximation to wave propagation.
[Ref. 9]
2. Vector or Phaser Systems
For emitter location, vector or phasor systems use
both amplitude and phase information of the signal of
interest. These systems need multiport antennas and at least
two amplitude-and-phase-coherent receivers. An extension of
vector or phasor systems, termed Wavefront-Analysis (WFA)
systems resolve multicomponent wave fields. The main
difference between vector and WFA is that WFA require a normal
receiver-processor-output system which can determine the
incident wave parameters like arriving angles, both azimuth
and elevation and relative amplitude and phase. Signals are
processed in digital form, thereby fully preserving relative
amplitude and phase. Time-dif ference-of-arrival (TDOA)
technique is a good example of WFA DF systems. ESL's system
makes use of this technique. [Ref . 7]
a. TDOA Technique
The basic method used to determine the direction
to an RF emitter is to measure the time difference of arrival
(TDOA) of the RF wavefront between two DF antennas. Figure
3 shows the geometry of the technique. [Ref . 9] It consists
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of two antennas separated by a baseline length: d. A wave
impinging at an angle from the normal arrives at antenna B
before antenna A by a time difference, AT, which actually
defines a hyperbola and is determined by
AT = t^ - t2 = constant
the emitter can be anywhere on hyperbola, hence, usually we




where c is the velocity of propagation.
A ^-
-^ INCOMING WAVE
ANTENNA V / \ T ANTENNA
^8
Figure 3 - Geometry for TDOA
Here, it is necessary to measure T accurately to
determine the angle of arrival that needs to be measured with
an accuracy of hundredths of nanoseconds. To determine an
emitter location requires two crossing angles or a minimum of
three antennas.
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E. ESM SYSTEM IN OPERATIONS OF WAR
In the light of discussion carried out in Chapter III and
in this chapter, one can summarize the employment and utility
of intercept and DF system in the divisional communication
scenario during various operations of war.
1. Defensive Operation
During the initial stages of defense, when the line
network is being laid out, VHF radio relay communication is
used extensively. The main force uses line and radio relay,
but covering troops use radio extensively. Therefore by
interception of enemy communication and direction finding his
emitters, one not only gains useful information of enemy
intentions, rather we can designate air and artillery targets.
This information can also help in planning ECM against the
hostile emitters.
2. Offensive Operation
During attack, radio becomes the primary means of
communication. However, during the advance operation before
making contact with the adversary forces, VHF radio relay acts
as a backbone for command and control of maneuvering forces.
By intercepting enemy communication, we can determine the
amount of transmission activity, grouping and regrouping of
forces in a particular sector of operation. The direction
finding system will indicate the movement patterns of the
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emitter, thus enabling us to deduce enemy maneuvers and his
intentions.
3. Withdrawal Operation
Radio being the principal means of communication in
withdrawal, is subject to maximum exploitation by intercept
and DF resources. The movement pattern of emitters can help
in determining the enemy's role of withdrawal, allowing the
use of air and artillery to jeopardize his withdrawal.
The increasingly dense, complex signal environment demands
programmable, high performance ESM systems. Improvements in
performance for DF and surveillance applications are
achievable, while at the same time maintaining high
reliability, small size, and low cost. New technology along
with innovative design methods can satisfy the requirements




An evaluation in a defense system's acquisition program
should reduce or eliminate the areas of risk. It serves a
number of useful functions, providing information about a
number of contractors. Evaluation provides information to
developers to assist in the identification and resolution of
technical difficulties. It also provides information to
decision makers responsible for making the investment decision
to procure a new system and for deciding on the most effective
use of limited resources. Moreover, an evaluation provides
information to operational users to support the development
of effective tactics, doctrine, and procedures.
For this thesis, letters were sent to sixteen
manufacturers actively engaged in developing VHF intercept and
DF systems. Appendix A includes a list of all those
approached along with their addresses.
Only Watkins Johnson, ESL, Zeeta, HRB Singer, and Napco
Internationals responded positively to the request. After
reviewing the literature provided by these manufacturers,
Watkins Johnson, ESL, and HRB Singer (see the figures in
Appendix B.) were selected for the purpose of this evaluation.
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The main criteria for their selection was the amount of
detailed information provided about their systems.
B. LIMITATIONS
a. The following aspects are not addressed in this
evaluation:
1) Expected threat analysis.
2) Enemy resources and capabilities.
3) Existing Pakistan Army EW resources and
capabilities.
4) Signal equipment analysis.
b. The logistic efforts required to support the proposed
intercept and DF system could not be evaluated due to
insufficient information and time.
c. ECM vulnerability could not be assessed since field
tests were not feasible and equipment was not
available.
d. Proprietary or security classification constraints on
the part of contractors.
C. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA*
The following criteria provide the rationale and basis for
scoring each evaluation parameter. Each parameter has
subcategories scored from to 1.0 with zero being lowest and
unity being highest. There are a total of 49 parameters
which are scored for a total maximum score of 49 for each
Most of the material is derived from Reference 10
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since every subelement of each parameter significantly effects
the mission performance, therefore, they are additive and with
equal weights. However if any system offers a capability
beyond the threshold setting which results in performance
enhancement, then a bonus point in fraction is awarded in








30 MHZ - 300 MHZ
Full coverage = 1.0
Partial coverage = 0.5
How large is the range of
power levels between the
processing sensitivity and
when the signals become
detectable.
60 dB = 0.25
65 dB = 0.5
70 dB = 0.75
75 dB = 1.0
Can the system be tasked for
automatic, prioritized




How many signals can be
acquired in 5 seconds with
energy and parameter
measurement performed?
Less than 5 signals =1-5 signals = 0.25
6-10 signals = 0.50
11 - 15 signals = 0.75
Greater than 20 signals =
1.0
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Response How long does it take to
process the signals acquired
in 5 seconds, match them
against the emitter library
and display the finished
results?
Greater than 60 seconds =
50 - 60 seconds = 0.25
40 - 49 seconds =0.50
30 - 39 seconds = 0.75
Less than 3 seconds = 1.0
Parameter measurement How accurate are the
measurements for amplitude
and frequency?
This is a subjective




Very accurate = 1
less accurate = . 5
not accurate =
Direction Finding




minute? 2 LOB/seconds =1.0
Each signal more than 20,
add 0.05; each signal less
then 20, subtract 0.05.
Accuracy How accurate are the
communication DFs? ± 3
degrees = 1.0
Each degree better than ± 3
,
add 0.1; each degree worse
than ± 3, subtract 0.1.
DF/acquisition on

















receivers does the system
have? 2 receivers = 1.0
Add 0.1 for each additional
receiver, subtract 0.1 for
each receiver less than 2.
How many are the operator
positions in the system?
positions =1.0 Add 0.1 for
each additional position.




How well is the display
organized to allow the
operator to deal with heavy
environments?
This category is a
subjective one. Tradeoffs
must be made between the
amount of data presented and
the clarity of the
presentation, making use of
multi color schemes,
graphics etc.
Can the operator effectively
Operator Positionutilize all
his software controlled
system assets from his







Is the data presented to the
operator organized
effectively? Is the layout
of the operator's controls
and tools optimized for
convenience and ease of use?
Check availability of
multiple screens or multiple
terminals.
This is a subjective
evaluation based on the














Does the system support
recording with recorders and
operator annotation aids?
Does the system support
automatic recorder control
and logging?
Yes to both questions =1.0
Yes to one questions = 0.5
Does the system respond





Exploitation Aids Does the system have
hardware/software aids which





Bearing History Does the system maintain
bearing history and provide
for bearing smoothing on
targets?
Yes to both questions =1.0
Yes to one question = 0.5
No =
Emitter Libraries Does the system have an
extensive library of known
emitters to try to match
intercepted signals with?
Less than 500 =
500 - 1000 = 0.25
1001 - 2000 = 0.5
2001 - 3000 = 0.75
Greater than 3000 = 1.0
Re-acquisition
Recognition
Can the system correctly
identify a previously seen




Automatic Logging Does the system
automatically log system
detections, identifications,
and measurements? Can the
logs be recalled and
reviewed at the operators
discretion?
Yes to both questions =1.0
Other =
Event Recognition Can the system recognize
that an event is occurring,
or about to occur, based on













Environment Table Does the system have a large





Automatic File Lookup Does the system have data
base management tools that





Multiple Simultaneous Can the system process
Signals multiple simultaneous




Environment Table Is there a separate
environment table associated
with a receiver group to
perform preprocessing to









What is the total pps
processing capability of the
system?
100 Kpps - 199 Kpps =0.25
200 Kpps - 399 Kpps =0.5
400 Kpps - 800 Kpps =0.75
Greater than 800 Kpps =1.0




















Does the system hardware
exhibit sufficient
ruggedness to sustain rough
handling by men and during
transportation? System
response to shocks and
vibrations?
This is a subjective
evaluation based on the
apparent look of the
structure of the system.
Can the system architecture
accommodate additional
receivers and processors to





Internal Commonality Does the system make use of
common cards and






























Was the system constructed
to meet Mil-Spec
Requirements?
Built to meet = 0.75
Fully qualified = 1.0
Does the system meet Mil-
Spec Requirements for EMI?
Yes =1.0
No =
Transportability Type of vehicle required for
installation.
In .25 ton jeep = 1.0
In 1.5 ton truck = 0.7 5
In 2.5 ton trucks = 0.50
Space for other
Equipment
Is space left for
installation of other
augmentation equipment after
the basic N-suite is
installed?
In .25 ton jeep = 1.0
In 1.5 ton truck = 0.75
In 2.5 ton trucks = 0.50
Power Does the system offer
integral power source for
use in the field in case of













Time required to set up and
tear down the system in the
field.
20 minutes = 1.0
Each minute more than 20,
subtract 0.05; each minute
less than 20, add 0.05.
Operating temperature range
of the system?
-5 deg C to 50 deg C = 1.0
deg C to 50 deg C = 0.50
Does the system offer
integrated communication











How far along the
development cycle of the
system?
Fielded in U.S. Army = 1.0




Table I gives an overview of the criteria and their
resulting evaluations for all three systems. An asterisk (*)
represents a situation where information was not available.
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To ensure an unbiased evaluation, a supplementary system
comparison sheet is shown in Table II. It includes only those
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Tables I and II both show the superiority of the ESL
system.
A comparison of total scores in Tables I and II show that
the Watkins Johnson and HRB Singer systems change order when
the ranking is restricted to available information. This
suggests that further consideration of both systems may be
necessary.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to reduce the
risk involved in a VHF intercept and DF system acquisition
program if undertaken in the near future by the Pakistan Army.
Therefore, the author has evaluated the VHF Intercept and
Direction Finding (DF) collection systems developed by three
different manufacturers for use by a divisional level signal
battalion. This thesis examined systems developed by ESL
International, Watkin Johnson, and HRB Singer on the basis
of performance, design and supportability issues. The scoring
criteria and rationale discussed in Chapter VI of this thesis
explains the weighting of each subelement of the intercept and
DF system.
From the discussions of EW mission categories, concept of
combat communication in a division, modern trends in
communication, generic intercept and DF systems, and
evaluation process, a number of points should be apparent.
First, tactical electronic reconnaissance (ER) is an important
activity towards tactical planning and adjustment of EW assets
to meet the current threats. Second, a large number of
tactical communication systems tend to dominate the VHF and
UHF portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Third, the
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expected dense electromagnetic environment heavily taxes the
existing intercept and DF collection capability of a
divisional signal battalion and demands enhancement of
resources. Similarly, an effective use of ECCM by friendly
forces should be emphasized to counter the enemy's EW effort,
which will be the only difference between winning and losing.
Fourth, the armies of developed countries now make effective
use of modern communication techniques like spread spectrum,
meteor burst communication, fiber optics, etc. Which
severely reduces not only the possibility of intercepting and
interpreting communications but jamming possibilities as well.
The key to secure and reliable communication is having modern
covert communication assets within existing financial
constraints. Fifth, the modern intercept and DF systems
employ novel ideas which offers dependable and reliable signal
detection, identification, location, and analysis procedures.
The procedures followed are software oriented. The software
can be changed to enhance the system performance keeping the
hardware intact. Sixth, fully automatic systems are one or
two orders of magnitude faster and more accurate than manual
systems. Finally, the objective evaluation of an intercept
and DF system leads us to the conclusion that the ESL
International system should meet the mission and operational




This thesis offers the following recommendations:
a. The intercept and DF systeir developed by ESL meets
the mission needs of a divisional signal battalion
in the current threat environment.
b. An intercept and DF platoon equipped with the
selected system should be integrated as an integral
part of the radio company of a divisional signal
battalion.
c. The introduction of a new system will affect the
tactical doctrine and concept of combat
communication at divisional level. Therefore, in
addition to the operational test of the system, the
operational test (OT) team should perform the
following:
1) Study the affect on tactical doctrine and
concept of combat communication in a division.
2) Assess the impact on the Table of Organization
and Equipment (TO&E) of signal battalion and
suggest manpower increase required to achieve
the desired performance objectives.
3) Analyze and determine the compatibility of the
new system with the existing resources of a
signal battalion to take care of divisional
intercept and DF needs.
4) Assess the impact of the system operation and
maintenance, and evaluate the need for
additional training, associated publications,
training aids and time.
5) Confirm the system parameters chosen in this
thesis work under real field environments.
d. Before the operational test is carried out, the




3) Operator and maintenance manuals
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4) First echelon to depot level maintenance
support
e. The system should be hardened to survive a nuclear
electromagnetic pulse.
f. The contractor should be responsible for system
engineering and maintenance support for the first
year after the installation of the system.
g. A feasibility study should be carried out to assess
the suitability and affordability of having secure
fiber optic links from division to corps and corps
to army headquarters.
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